Loyalty and Agency Problems: Study Comparing France Tunisia – Introduction

Following the strategies used by companies to manage the relationship with shareholders, such as loyalty, analysis on the subject of this strategy require governance capable of stemming the potential destruction of shareholder wealth and mitigate the problems presented in this relationship, as proposed by the agency theory.
In particular, the explanation of loyalty in terms of conflict in this relationship tends to win in a dominant approach. Indeed, much research shows that the role of loyalty is in a relatively narrow perspective in reducing conflicts of interest and value creation, as it is purely incentive in relation shareholders / directors (Monsen and Downs; Desbrieres, Easterbrook, Coffee;-Gunesh Boolell, Broihanne and Merli, etc.).. owever, as an emerging concept, often used in studies in marketing, loyalty pervades today the field of finance. Indeed, the proliferation of small shareholders in the capital of the company and the presence of a shareholder holding a significant share is an effective control of management. Significant control normally provides a high power to control persons and requires the leader to work fully in the public interest of investors. In addition, a shareholder may lose interest in a company in which the power of leaders is important. We can consider therefore that the pressure on the leaders is strong. Subsequently, conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers arise, influencing the decisions of investments. However, the presence of significant shareholders in the capital of the company is not a solution to these problems. The resolution of these issues led company officials to adopt strategies of shareholder loyalty.
The present work is therefore, from this perspective that seeks to develop a conceptual framework for understanding the intensity factors of retention in agency problems. In this context, we support the hypothesis that retention of such shareholders depends on the degree of distribution of dividends, a policy of transparent communication and detention of leaders of a share of the capital.
Specifically, this study aims to empirically verify this hypothesis in two different application fields and deepening the clarification of the role of loyalty in reducing agency problems.
After returning to the objectives of managers and shareholders and a presentation of the costs of the relationship shareholders / managers, we propose a typology of the different incentives of both parties acting in this relationship and exposure assumptions that are subject to the empirical analysis.
To better understand our problem, we will identify the different objectives of each part of the relationship shareholder / manager.