Loyalty and Agency Problems: Study Comparing France Tunisia – Convergence of interests

This hypothesis for the attention of managers shareholders, the stock price and conflicts of interest between shareholders directors and other shareholders. To test this relationship, we linked the variables that explain manager’s shareholders, the stock price and the problems of conflicting interests.
i) The case of French companies correlations

Managershareholder Coursboursier Divergence
Spearman’s rho Dirigeantactionnaire CorrelationCoefficient 1,000 ,537 -,427
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 ,006
N 40 40 40
Coursboursier CorrelationCoefficient ,537 1.000 -,963
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000
N 40 40 40
Divergence CorrelationCoefficient -,427 -,963 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) ,006 ,000
N 40 40 40

ii) The case of Tunisian companies Correlations

Managershareholder Coursboursier Divergence
Spearman’s rho Dirigeantactionnaire CorrelationCoefficient 1,000 ,392 ,355
Sig. (2-tailed) ,087 ,125
N 20 20 20
Coursboursier CorrelationCoefficient ,392 1.000 -,963
Sig. (2-tailed) ,087 ,012
N 20 20 20
Divergence CorrelationCoefficient ,355 -,550 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) ,125 ,012
N 20 20 20

The results of the Spearman correlation test in the French sample shows a positive and significant at 1% between managers and shareholders the evolution of stock price and a negative correlation between shareholders and management problems of divergence of interests in accordance with the hypothesis H2 ‘. Note the possible existence of a reverse causal effect in this case. Indeed, the problems of conflict of interest will be mitigated by the fact that managers have a stake and that they fully work to increase shareholder wealth. This result is important because it confirms that if there is separation of ownership and decision-making, samples of managers will be more important (Demstez, 1983).
In contrast, in the Tunisian sample, we find that managers do not affect the shareholder conflict of interest problems. For cons, the stock price is influenced by the shareholders of managers (the correlation between shareholders and managers of stock price changes is significant at 10%). The share price declines following the emergence of agency problems within the company (there is a negative and significant at the 5% from agency problems and the stock price).
H3: Publication of information, satisfaction of shareholders and the problem of information asymmetry
To test our third hypothesis, we correlated the variables explaining the publication of information, satisfaction of shareholders and the problems of asymmetric information.
i) The case of French companies correlations

Publication of information satisfactionof

shareholders

problem ofinformation

asymmetry

Spearman’s rho Publicationof

information

CorrelationCoefficient 1,000 ,425 -,568
Sig. (2-tailed) ,006 ,000
N 40 40 40
satisfaction of shareholders CorrelationCoefficient ,425 1.000 -, 496
Sig. (2-tailed) ,006 ,001
N 40 40 40
problem ofinformation

asymmetry

CorrelationCoefficient -,568 -,496 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 ,001
N 40 40 40

In the French sample, the variable publication of information is positively correlated with the variable shareholder satisfaction and negatively to the problems of asymmetric information. According to our hypothesis, it encourages managers to voluntarily disclose information to achieve economic goals and the rules and social norms (and Matoussi Chakroun, 2009). This result joins the results found in the study and Matoussi Chakroun conducted on the Tunisian context.
Here, a sense of reverse causality may also be considered. The fact that leaders produce good management with shareholders, reduces problems of asymmetric and probably reinforces the satisfaction and confidence that they give them, while improving their relationship with them.
ii) The case of Tunisian companies correlations

Publication of information satisfactionof

shareholders

problem ofinformation

asymmetry

Spearman’s rho Publicationof

information

CorrelationCoefficient 1,000 ,121 -,476
Sig. (2-tailed) ,612 ,039
N 20 20 20
satisfaction of shareholders CorrelationCoefficient ,121 1.000 ,047
Sig. (2-tailed) ,612 ,849
N 20 20 19
problem ofinformation

asymmetry

CorrelationCoefficient -,476 ,047 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) ,039 ,849
N 20 20 20